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ABSTRACT
In assessing the social impacts of major urban transport-infrastructure projects Impact
Assessment (IA) practitioners determine and facilitate the equitable distribution of project
beneﬁts and costs. They do this in a context of governmental policy objectives and
stakeholder interests. Public investment in transport projects shapes contemporary planning
of urban Australian cities, addressing common challenges of rapid and sprawling population
growth. Politically-driven ‘urgency’ in delivering new infrastructure, raises questions about
long-term strategic beneﬁt and delivery of the positive social and environmental outcomes
that often frame their announcement.
Follow-up to assess outcomes against policy objectives and stakeholder interests, however,
is rare and tools to facilitate genuine public accountability through project phases are lacking.
This paper discusses the need for better management and follow-up of social impacts from
urban transport-infrastructure projects. Drawing insights from a review of the (partial)
delivery of the former NSW Government’s Parramatta Rail Link project, it evaluates social
impact management strategies applied against the achievement of social and transport
policy objectives. Lessons introduced highlight the constraints and limitations on good
practice IA and Social Impact Assessment, the importance of early practitioner and
community involvement and that political decision-making for urban transport-infrastructure
has the greater inﬂuence on delivering social outcomes.
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Introduction
Australian cities are experiencing a period of disrup-
tion as major transport-infrastructure projects are
developed with urgency to meet population demands.
Announced with much political fanfare, these projects
promise to deliver public beneﬁts and are subject to
considerable Environmental Impact Assessment
(EIA) during approval processes. The political urgency
that frames advocacy of rapid expansion of investment
in infrastructure in Australia’s major cities aims to cre-
ate signiﬁcant economic and social change and is rou-
tinely marshalled to secure wider political mandates
(Legacy 2017). Yet public reporting of and accountabil-
ity for delivery on the beneﬁcial social outcomes from
projects is at best poor, and at worst, inaccurate or mis-
leading. And follow-up of project outcomes against
EIA and Social Impact Assessment (SIA) predictions
is rare. Through review of recent literature and experi-
ence, this paper highlights the relevance of social
impact management practices in the evaluation of
major-infrastructure projects against policy outcomes.
It discusses good practice concepts in SIA and EIA Fol-
low-up and the strategic planning context in which
they operate. It concludes there are strong arguments
for better management and follow-up of social impacts
from major transport-infrastructure projects, and their
performance against assessment predictions and policy
objectives used to frame project planning approvals to
facilitate accountability for outcomes. It oﬀers a case
study of the evaluation of social impact management
strategies applied against policy objectives of the (partial)
delivery of the Parramatta Rail Link (PRL) for Sydney.
Problem background: evaluating the success
of major infrastructure projects in society
Rapid planned growth of, and investment in, Austra-
lian transport-infrastructure, particularly in Sydney,
in the next 20 years requires governments and project
managers to monitor expediently and respond to social
eﬀects of these activities in the longer term (Infrastruc-
ture NSW 2018). Public criticism of and interest in
such projects increases as society becomes more
empowered and invested in proposals through com-
munity engagement practices in governance and devel-
opment EIA processes (Esteves, Franks, and Vanclay
2012; O’Faircheallaigh 2009). As part of development
assessment, SIA inﬂuences fair and equitable distri-
bution, avoidance and management of social impacts
(Ziller 2012). An SIA report is typically presented as
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an Appendix to an Environmental Impact Statement
(EIS), albeit downplayed by presentation in this context
(Vanclay 2003). Good practice in EIA and SIA often
reﬂects an iterative process of identifying and mana-
ging adverse outcomes during all project phases (Van-
clay et al. 2015). Yet, once projects are approved,
follow-up on project-scale assessment reports is rare
(Nogrady 2013; Morrison-Saunders, Arts, and Mar-
shall 2007).
Two broad approaches to follow-up can be distin-
guished. One approach considers the extent to which
the project approved is actually delivered once post-
approval modiﬁcations occur. The other considers the
actual impacts of the delivered project, and the eﬃcacy
of impact mitigation and management responses rec-
ommended in the pre-approval impact assessment pro-
cesses. For major transport-infrastructure projects,
project purpose is often framed in very broad strategic
terms such as city or regional scale transport planning,
macroeconomic policy goals and future prooﬁng econ-
omically and strategically signiﬁcant connections. In
the absence of broad Strategic Environmental Assess-
ment (SEA)’s of strategic plans (see Therivel 2004)
and considering the Australian preference for project-
based assessment and approval, the need for clear state-
ment of project purpose and assessment and post-
approval evaluation against that purpose is necessary
to provide a framework that builds political accountabil-
ity, public trust and project eﬀectiveness.
Project success, however, even for strategic infra-
structure projects is most commonly discussed publicly
in terms of on-budget and/or on-time completion. Yet
the social beneﬁts promoted as justiﬁcation for major
transport projects, are frequently not measurable
using either time or budget frames (Flyvbjerg 2014).
Flyvbjerg, Bruzelius, and Rothengatter (2003) suggest
a paradox exists between the signiﬁcant societal
beneﬁt of infrastructure mega-projects and their poor
performance in economy, public support and environ-
mental impacts (see also Flyvbjerg 2014). Cost over-
runs and lower-than-predicted revenues frequently
limit project viability and are commonplace globally,
reported in Europe, Africa and Australia (Flyvbjerg,
Bruzelius, and Rothengatter 2003; Terrill and Danks
2016). Predicted economic, social and environmental
impacts identiﬁed in business cases, cost–beneﬁt ana-
lyses and EIAs, are often miscalculated or under
reported, leading to excessive scrutiny and public dis-
trust in both projects and decision-making (Flyvbjerg,
Bruzelius, and Rothengatter 2003; Flyvbjerg 2014).
Trust, public participation, governance and accountabil-
ity in the political decision-making process, therefore,
weigh greatly on the success of SIA practice, inﬂuencing
the practitioner’s input during the assessment process
(Flyvbjerg, Bruzelius, and Rothengatter 2003).
Aligning social and transport policy goals may assist
projects in successfully meeting the needs of the public
(Hale 2011). Deﬁning long-term goals for urban trans-
port-infrastructure projects and systems is typically
done at metropolitan and regional scales. While they
might be framed at the metropolitan-scale, projects
inevitably have implications at both a wider whole-
of-society scale and the scale of aﬀected local commu-
nities (Hale 2011). EIA practitioners reviewing project
proposals have a responsibility to balance govern-
ments’ system-wide and public policy goals with pro-
ponent, societal and determining authority objectives
in developing monitoring strategies. In reality, as
Serje (2017) notes, the societal-scale changes in social
relations created by projects, plans and policies are
poorly conceptualised and hardly considered in many
SIAs. As such, it is relevant to consider what might
be good practice in SIA.
Good SIA practice and management of social
impacts
SIA literature abounds with ‘state of the art’ practice
reviews (eg Burdge and Vanclay 1996; Vanclay 2003;
Vanclay and Esteves 2011; Esteves, Franks, and Van-
clay 2012; Vanclay et al. 2015; Arce-Gomez, Donovan,
and Bedggood 2015). Good practice in SIA, however
requires EIS practitioner teams (typically led by phys-
ical scientists, project managers and decision-makers)
to possess appropriate experience in the social sciences
foundational to SIA (Ross and McGee 2006; Ziller
2012; Arce-Gomez, Donovan, and Bedggood 2015).
The SIA literature emphasises the need for community
participation and engagement using social science
methods, particularly in inﬂuencing whether manage-
ment strategies proposed to address predicted impacts
will deliver desired policy outcomes, and fair, equitable,
and justiﬁable distribution of project impacts, includ-
ing eﬀects on disadvantaged groups (eg Howitt 1989;
Howitt and Stevens 2016; O’Faircheallaigh 1999, 2009).
Good practice methods for post-approval manage-
ment of social impacts require preparation and
implementation of Social Impact Management Plans
(SIMPs) (Vanclay et al. 2015). Franks and Vanclay
(2013) emphasise theneed forSIMPs to include continued
engagement of impacted impact communities during
monitoring and management as important in achieving
successful social outcomes. Despite academic advocacy
of SIMPs, they remain uncommon in practice unless leg-
allymandated inproject approval conditionsbyregulators
(eg DPI 2012). In contrast, post-approval Environmental
Management Plans are commonly implemented as an
industry-accepted standard response to EIA reports.
EIA follow-up
The idea of EIA follow-up is well-established, with the
International Association of Impact Assessment
(IAIA), deﬁning it as ‘the monitoring, evaluation,
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management and communication of the environ-
mental performance of a project or plan’ (Morrison-
Saunders, Arts, and Marshall 2007, 1). EIA follow-up
provides opportunity to evaluate the accuracy of pre-
dictions and the eﬀectiveness of management strategies
proposed. The value proposition for follow-up is
widely acknowledged in terms of lessons learned, prac-
tice improvements, impact management and achieving
sustainable outcomes in delivering projects, strategic
policies, plans and programs (Morrison-Saunders,
Arts, and Marshall 2007; Morrison-Saunders, Baker,
and Arts 2003; Arts and Faith-Ell 2012).
Good EIA follow-up may also assist aﬀected commu-
nities to understand the environmental performance of
an activity, engaging with them to resolve concerns that
may have arisen post-approval (Morrison-Saunders,
Baker, and Arts 2003). In large infrastructure projects,
EIS processes are undertaken with best knowledge
available, but uncertainties often remain and require
post-approval project design modiﬁcations. Conse-
quently, pre-approval impact predictions andprojections
may become inaccurate or irrelevant by the time projects
are delivered (Storey and Jones 2003). EIA follow-up that
reviews project performance against study predictions
and policy objectives help to address uncertainties
through monitoring, adaptive management and contin-
gency planning (Storey and Jones 2003; Franks and
Vanclay 2013).
While there are many types of EIA follow-up (see
Arts and Morrison-Saunders 2004) there is little
research regarding the extension of these tools to
SIA. Environmental impacts are readily regulated
through established monitoring practices and govern-
ance frameworks, such as environmental management
systems and plans and have standards related (eg the
International Standardization Association (ISO)
14001), yet equivalent tools for managing social
impacts are not widely accepted (Franks and Vanclay
2013; Storey and Noble 2005). This is due in part to
methodological diﬃculties that face SIA follow-up
(eg. Gagnon 2003) and the absence of suitable tools
for monitoring management strategies (Cashmore,
Bond, and Sadler 2009; O’Faircheallaigh 2009).
Managing the social impacts of transport
development in Sydney: local context
Strategic urban planning & follow-up
The Greater Sydney Region Plan - AMetropolis of Three
Cities (Greater Sydney Commission 2018), Future
Transport Strategy 2056 (Transport for NSW
(TfNSW) 2018a) and State Infrastructure Strategy
2018-2038 (Infrastructure NSW 2018) set the strategic
context for land use, transport and infrastructure plan-
ning in Greater Sydney.
While these plans and policies are set externally to
political cycles, accountability for achieving objectives is
ostensibly secured through legally-enforcedmanagement
strategies, regulated by the Department of Planning and
Environment (DPE) and other agencies in individual
project approval conditions (Preston 2015; see DPE
2017b) or if state-funded, through the NSW Treasury’s
internal compulsory seven-gate project-lifecycle review;
the Gateway Review Process (NSW Treasury 2017).
The role of impact assessment
Strategic plans and concept designs are assessed under
the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979
(The Act). The Act requires signiﬁcant developments
to complete an EIS that identiﬁes and assesses environ-
mental, social and economic impacts to inform
decision-making on whether a development should
proceed (see Part 4 & Part 5). Section 1.4(1) deﬁnes
environment as including:
all aspects of the surroundings of humans, whether
aﬀecting any human as an individual or in his or her
social groupings.
SIA, however, is not explicitly mandated for govern-
ment projects. What is mandated is that ‘social’ factors
should be considered by public authorities,1 the public
must be consulted2 and the principles of ecologically
sustainable development must be considered3 (Preston
2015). Any requirement for or commitment to SIA, is
determined by the DPE following an application, the
government body/proponent (see section 5.1 of the
Act), established DPE SIA guidelines (see DPE
2017a) or the practitioner scoping EIS requirements.
Urban-scale plans and key infrastructure projects
are inevitably highly politicised and in Australia have
been characterised by poor transparency, top-down
and bottom-up antagonism and poor delivery against
strategic goals (Legacy, Curtis, and Scheurer 2017). Stra-
tegic infrastructure plans are not assessed using SEA, and
project-speciﬁc SIA criteria are often poorly matched to
key impacts of projects as-delivered. While SIA follow-
up focused on either of these elements would increase
transparency and accountability, there is no political
appetite to mandate either SIA or follow-up reviews.
In that case, there will be increased reliance on securing
improved SIA practice wherever possible, and a need to
encourage academic research that undertakes follow-up
evaluations of projects independently.
Parramatta rail link: exemplar of good
practice or lessons to be learned?
Methodology
To further investigate these issues and their conse-
quences in the follow-up and management of social
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impacts of major transport-infrastructure projects, a
critical assessment was undertaken using a speciﬁc
Sydney-located case, the PRL. The PRL was selected as:
. Adequate passage of time to evaluate management
strategies proposed,
. Suﬃcient temporal distance from the decisions to
allow participants to reﬂect freely on issues raised,
and,
. Both social and transport goals as a major urban
infrastructure project were targeted by the project.
In reviewing the assessment and decision making
around the PRL, three methods were utilised; (1) Lit-
erature review, (2) Case study analysis and (3) Semi-
structured interviews:
(1) Literature review established the nature of the
research as well as good practice SIA benchmarks,
including local and international guidelines, pol-
icies, legislation and plans publicly available.
(2) PRL documents were reviewed, including the EIS,
policy documents and relevant secondary sources.
This supported documentation of a timeline of
events, ﬁeld investigations and interview
discussions.
(3) Semi-structured interviews with contributors to
the PRL case were undertaken during June to
August 2016, with a total of 17 key informants
(see Table 1). Participants may have undertaken
more than one role.
Selection focused on those whose decisions contributed
to the outcomes of the project. Third party stake-
holders aﬀected by decisions were also consulted to
balance the perspectives of decision-makers. Key
ﬁndings of interviews were transcribed and analysed
using coding and theming and reﬂexive memos were
used to identify common themes, ideas and relation-
ships for further consideration (Cope 2016; Dunn
2016).
Historical context
A heavy rail system connecting the Northern suburbs
of Sydney via the West appeared as early as Bradﬁeld’s
thesis as a St Leonards to Eastwood connection
(Bradﬁeld 1924; Gooding 2009). The PRL was ﬁrst
announced in the NSW Government’s Action for
Transport 2010, an integrated transport plan for Sydney
(Action for Transport 2010) in 1998 and was approved
over 15 years ago (see Table 2) (DoT 1998). A 27 km
extension to the existing Sydney rail network was pro-
posed, which would link Parramatta and Chatswood
via Epping (Figure 1) (DoP 2002; ERMK 1999).
In addition to Action for Transport 2010, several
other NSW government plans indicated that the PRL
was fundamental to achieving common transport-
oriented policy objectives; to reduce car dependency,
increase public transport usage and create more acces-
sible transport opportunities to access employment and
economic centres cross-regionally in Sydney (ERMK
1999). There was, however, no speciﬁc SEA that
reviewed the ways in which the PRL would meet gov-
ernments’ high-level strategic transport objectives. As
the project that was proposed and subject to EIA
review and the project as-delivered were ultimately
quite diﬀerent, this makes evaluation of the project’s
delivery against its stated purpose very diﬃcult.
Key socio-economic impacts and beneﬁts predicted
in the EIS primarily included (ERMK 1999):
. No loss of social cohesion or severance due to tun-
nelling methods,
. Improved accessibility to services and employment,
. Improved amenity, transport and housing choice,
. Equity beneﬁts in terms of urban planning and
mobility for residents;
. Intensiﬁcation of commercial and residential devel-
opment along the alignment; and
. Temporary construction-related impacts on local
access and amenity, such as increased noise and
vibration.
No separate specialist SIA study was prepared. This
absence means that many of the predicted social
eﬀects of the project were not subject to rigorous scru-
tiny, which makes formal follow-up to evaluate the
eﬃcacy of proposed impact mitigation and manage-
ment strategies also very diﬃcult.
The proposed route (Figure 1) included key com-
ponents (PRL Co. 2001, 1–5, 1–6):
















Table 2. Parramatta rail link - key statutory dates.
Event Date
State Environmental Planning Policy (SEPP) No. 63
is gazetted to facilitate the approval of projects
in Action for Transport 2010.
2 February 2001
Approved with 260 conditions, under Part 5 of
the NSW Environmental Planning and
Assessment Act 1979 by the Director-General of
the DOP (DoP 2002).
27 February 2002
Approval modiﬁcations for the Epping Transport
Interchange, Chatswood Transport
Interchange and Parramatta Transport
Interchange redevelopments.
17, 28 June & 14
December 2004
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. A twin track railway linking the North Shore Line,
Main North Line and Main West Line;
. Dive structures to connect the PRL with existing rail
corridors;
. Upgrading of existing stations;
. New Stations at Macquarie University, Macquarie
Park, Rosehill/Camellia, Delhi Road (North Ryde),
University of Technology, Sydney (UTS) (Ku-ring-
gai);
. Duplications of surface track along existing Carling-
ford Line between Carlingford and Camellia, on the
North Shore Line rail corridor near Chatswood and
near the dive structures at Westmead and Epping;
. 800-vehicle carpark at Carlingford Station;
. Easy access and Bicycle storage facilities at all
stations; and
. Noise barriers along the Carlingford Line
The PRL was expected to have four to six trains per
hour each way between Epping and Parramatta, and
eight to ten trains per hour each way between Chats-
wood and Epping (ERMK 1999). The initial capital
cost was estimated in the EIS at $1.4 billion.
During the approval, design and consultation pro-
cesses, the proposal underwent signiﬁcant design
modiﬁcations. This included removal of a proposed
bridge through the Lane Cove National Park (LCNP)
in favour of a tunnel option and the cancellation of
the UTS (Ku-ring-gai) station. Following the modiﬁ-
cations, costs increased to $2.3 billion (Auditor-Gen-
eral 2005) resulting in only the ﬁrst stage of the
proposal, the Epping to Chatswood Rail Link
(ECRL), being delivered in 2009 (Figure 2) (CityRail
2009). The ECRL operates four to six services each
way per hour, starting at Chatswood on the ‘T1
North Shore & Northern’ route.
In 2003, the second stage of the proposal, the Parra-
matta to Epping Rail Link (PERL) was postponed, as a
result of a redraft of the state government’s transport
plan by the incoming Transport Services Minister
(Kerr 2003). In February 2011 it returned to the state
agenda with a promise co-funding of $2.1 billion
from the Federal Labor Government, only to be post-
poned again in 2013 until 2019/2020, subsequent to a
funding request rejection and a change from Labor to
Coalition at the state level (Robins 2011; Aston 2013).
As a result, the as-constructed project did not
achieve a key public policy purpose articulated in
Action for Transport 2010 (DoT 1998): to improve pub-
lic transport from Western Sydney’s Parramatta and
connect commuters to growth centres in the North-
West.
In 2018, the NSW Government announced the
planning approval to convert the Camellia to
Figure 1. PRL Alignment. Source: ERMK (1999, 1–2, Figure 1.1)
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Carlingford section of the Carlingford Line (on the
PERL alignment) for the Stage 1 Parramatta Light
Rail project and an extension of this to Epping is
under investigation, which completes the connection
from the West to the North-West (TfNSW 2018b).
The ECRL is also being replaced, with a rapid transit
metro service integrated into the 36 km Sydney Metro
Northwest project, increasing services to 15 in both
directions during the peak (TfNSW 2017).
Results: key insights in the management of
social impacts
Discussions with interviewees concerning the EIA and
approvals process for the PRL highlighted strengths
and weaknesses of methods utilised to prepare the
EIS. Practitioners felt the process was eﬀective, invol-
ving a ‘massive team of people’ and that it was probably
one of ‘the most complicated EIS’ prepared at that
time. Practitioners also noted one of the most challen-
ging aspects were the political pressures placed on the
process through unrealistic (‘ridiculous’ and ‘comple-
tely unachievable’) initial timeframes and Ministerial
expectations given for the design progress:
we didn’t have a project deﬁnition… Fundamentally
it takes a long time to plan complicated infrastructure,
it’s not a quick tick oﬀ process (Practitioner 1).
These problems also challenged the initial scoping of
the EIS, placing pressures on assessment timeframes.
The client’s ‘set view on the option’ [to build a bridge
through the LCNP] also inﬂuenced the capacity of
the assessment to appropriately investigate issues viable
design alternatives for the proposal (Practitioner 1).
This later proved signiﬁcant for the project, as the
absence of robust assessment of alternatives for crossing
the Lane Cove River emerged as a weakness of the
EIS that could have been addressed with a stronger
strategic justiﬁcation presented to the community
(Practitioner 2).
EIA practitioners interviewed stressed the impor-
tance of community and stakeholder consultation as
fundamental to good practice and most felt that the
process was extensive, and the community understood
the impacts and beneﬁts. The proposed bridge in
LCNP engendered much community comment and
ultimately inﬂuenced a signiﬁcant project design
change to a tunnel option (Practitioner 1, 2; Govern-
ment Oﬃcial 1, 2). As a weakness of the process, sev-
eral participants commented that the community
voice was overly inﬂuential on the progression of the
project and inhibited its progress.
When the bridge option was ﬁrst shown to the com-
munity as part of the EIS:
There was a lot of worry from the community about
visual impacts… so, once the momentum got going
on… they were able to mount an argument that was
unable to be countered by the EIS or the evaluation
that [DoP] did. So the route had to be changed (Gov-
ernment Oﬃcial 2).
Some participants concluded that the local community
views were not representative of the wider society view
Figure 2. ECRL Alignment. Source: Transport Infrastructure Development Corporation (2008)
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and that the government did not ensure the ‘greater
good’ was secured (Government Ofﬁcial 3). This
meant that the initial public policy objectives were
compromised, as the ﬁnal design solution produced
signiﬁcant cost increases and negatively inﬂuenced pol-
itical decision-making for the PERL.
The lack of transparency around how decisions were
made by the government also emerged in discussion.
Although the EIA practitioners believed they provided
technical advice regarding the need for the PRL, the
cancellation of the PERL was a political decision. In
the end, there was ‘no role in the planning system to
inﬂuence these decisions in the outcome’ (Practitioner 1).
Practitioner 2 reﬂected that the PRL, ‘ …was a clas-
sic example when you can get the planning approval,
but the money committed only allows for half the
project.’
More seriously, the political nature of the decision-
making marginalised expert advice:
it went to Cabinet as the Chatswood to Parramatta
Rail Link project, and came out of the Cabinet that
day, as the Chatswood to Epping Rail Line. The pri-
mary reason was, there is no demand and we can’t
aﬀord it… putting aside the strategic policy and
plan… [meant there] was a political decision in the
end…without getting expert advice (Government
Oﬃcial 2)
In other words, the existing design and assessment was
overturned in Cabinet in expedient response to politi-
cal pressures, without reference to an evaluation of the
modiﬁed project against established policy or project
objectives. Practitioner 1, reﬂecting on this Cabinet
decision, remarked ‘really, it was a political decision,
not a technical decision’. Government Ofﬁcial 1 further
commented that:
The amazing thing is that there is a process to get a
decision in favour of something, but there’s no process
for cancelling something. So a Premier comes out and
says, ‘oh well, we’ve decided we’re not doing that’. It’s
just like building something takes a long time, destroy-
ing something is done in a moment.
Adding to the complexity of this, Government Ofﬁcials
1, 3 & 4 and Practitioner 3 all commented that sufﬁ-
cient funds were never allocated to complete the PRL
and the Minister’s decision required the reallocation
of funds to allow the PERL to be built.
Diﬃculties in the management and monitoring of
social impacts over diﬀerent spatial and temporal scales
were noted in the PRL case study. Government Oﬃcial
3 highlighted that in public transport-infrastructure
planning, the consideration of the broader social issues
and eﬀects of proposals must be strategic in the
business case because impacts of linear alignments
that aﬀect multiple communities and local govern-
ments cannot be resolved at the project-scale. This is
linked to how management strategies can be judged
against policy objectives, which are typically set at
the metropolitan-scale, rather than the project-objec-
tive-scale at which they are monitored by approval
conditions (Government Oﬃcial 3). Government
Oﬃcial 6 also added the planning system is designed to
prevent unacceptable social impacts proceeding so that
local councils andMPs have an important role in follow-
ing up on reported eﬀects if complaints are received.
Other participants reﬂected that the social impact
management strategies proposed in the EIS, were little
more than ‘motherhood statements’ which would be
impossible to develop any long-term monitoring strat-
egy from (Government Oﬃcial 5). As such the legally
mandated approval conditions of the PRL focussed
on environmental impacts with indirect social eﬀects
including water quality and noise and vibration post-
operation (Government Oﬃcial 3).
Participants’ conclusions as to whether policy objec-
tives for the project had been met varied considerably.
Opinions around the project’s success in meeting its
policy objectives reﬂected individuals’ views of the gov-
ernment decision to cancel the PERL section. Most
participants concluded that the project was at least par-
tially successful in achieving government policy objec-
tives, as the ECRL has had positive social eﬀects.
Three participants, however, disagreed with that
conclusion. Government Oﬃcial 2, Third Party Stake-
holder 1, and Practitioner 1 each concluded that the
failure of the project to deliver the strategic metropoli-
tan planning outcomes framed for the PRL, (that is, to
provide connectivity from the western suburbs to the
north-west), meant that it was unsuccessful in meeting
policy objectives. Government Oﬃcial 2 did not believe
that any of the Action for Transport 2010 objectives had
been met and that the project failed to provide access at
the metropolitan-scale to the most disadvantaged
groups in Western Sydney.
Lessons learned and implications
The PRL case study oﬀers lessons in constraints and
inﬂuences on the assessment and management of social
impacts, particularly arising from the development
planning and EIA process and in the application of
good practice. Many interviewees suggested that the
Impact Assessment (IA) practitioner and community
are involved typically far too late in project develop-
ment. Scoping and evaluation of a range of design
alternatives was accepted as a key step in wider impact
practice (see Burdge and Vanclay 1996), but were not
allowed within the scope approved for the initial EIS
process. Arguably, this constrained potential for just
outcomes from the participatory approach to good
practice community engagement applied, as those
impacted were not consulted during planning (Lockie
2001; Howitt 1989). Early engagement thus is a
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relevant lesson learned, and as part of SIA, oﬀers
potential for reﬂection and mobilisation on social
relations, that planners should be open to (Serje 2017).
Participants’ comments also reﬂected on the impor-
tance of preparing a thorough business case and stra-
tegic argument for infrastructure proposals, and the
need for these to demonstrate how the project contrib-
utes to meeting strategic policy objectives. Early involve-
ment of expert practitioners, for example, through a
SEA, or in this case, a ‘strategic social impact assess-
ment’, which would scope social impacts and engage
the community, would also improve alignment of pro-
ject objectives with social and transport policy objectives
and support improved performance towards long-term
policy objectives. Conditions framed to meet speciﬁc
objectives could then be built into conditional allocation
of funding from the NSW Treasury. This would also
reduce the ‘politics’ in assessing the strategic need and
alternatives for a proposal. Early assessment also assists
in preventing politicians committing to projects ahead
of public interest prior to EIA (Terrill and Danks 2016).
While the EIA practitioners reﬂected on their adop-
tion of good practice EIA for the PRL, other partici-
pants’ responses highlighted weaknesses in social
impact management strategies, particularly for mitigat-
ing andmonitoring impacts at diﬀering spatial scales. It
was also identiﬁed that an SIA in accordance with
available guidelines was not undertaken (eg Cox
1995). These factors limited the ability for post-
approval follow-up and good practice opportunities
for management in addressing social impacts.
Acknowledging that IA practice has improved since
the EIS was prepared (see Vanclay 2003; Vanclay et
al. 2015), the application of SIA is not explicitly legis-
lated in NSW and challenges in social impact manage-
ment remain a weakness in practice (Harvey 2011).
These issues are linked to the achievement of PRL pol-
icy outcomes to an extent, but they were worsened by
political decisions aﬀecting the project development.
The PRL case also demonstrates that project-level
IA practice is marginalised in the public-transport
decision-making process when political and public
advocacy is framed around metropolitan-scale policy
outcomes. Good practice becomes irrelevant, when
practice is applied only to serve the government
decision-maker’s objectives, rather than evaluate
whether a project is just on social and environmental
grounds. It still is the case that while projects are pro-
posed in state-infrastructure plans and rigorous assess-
ments attempted during the planning approval process,
the same level of strategic assessment in follow-up is
unlikely to occur as a project is modiﬁed by political
and ﬁnancial assessments post-approval. Particularly
if there is no statutory obligation beyond good govern-
ance in treasury processes for further assessment if a
project is cancelled or signiﬁcantly modiﬁed in cabinet,
such as in the case of the PERL.
Political intervention in infrastructure projects makes
it diﬃcult to hold public decision-making accountable
for outcomes, even with the application of legally-man-
dated approval conditions. This results in inequitable
and unequal distribution of beneﬁts and risks (Flyvbjerg,
Bruzelius, and Rothengatter 2003) and inhibits good
practice in follow-up. Practitioners were denied the
opportunity to conduct EIA follow-up, which would
have allowed them to revaluate the reconﬁgured project
and generate revised management strategies that could
lead to delivery of the desired policy outcomes from
Action for Transport 2010. Perhaps this reassessment
may have led to a diﬀerent outcome for the PRL: addres-
sing the present strategic policy goals of connecting
Western Sydney to the North and without the urgency
currentlypressuringplanners forSydney (Greater Sydney
Commission 2018). Clearly, another important lesson to
be taken from this case is that strategic clarity is valuable
in making major commitments of public funds to trans-
port-infrastructure projects. Not only is it essential to
proper evaluation of project proposals and performance,
but also to the transparency and integrity of political
decision-making and the long-termcredibility of political
processes.
Conclusion and future directions
In investigating whether social policy outcomes were
met for the PRL project, this paper highlights that pol-
itical forces, external to the EIA and development
assessment processes, intervene in the scoping, design,
assessment, approval and management of major pro-
jects and have the greater inﬂuence on the delivery of
social and transport policy outcomes. The IA prac-
titioners’ inﬂuence is limited by political forces and
the constraints placed upon their practice by their cli-
ent or the relevant government department. This all-
too-familiar context for practitioners and urban plan-
ners, frequently limits their role in government-led
project decision-making.
For political decision makers, the conclusion is that
they are responsible for making ﬁnal decisions and are
held accountable at the ballot box in a parliamentary
democracy. The realpolitik, however, is that ministerial
appointments rely on political alliances, not on popular
electoral mandates. In the absence of transparency and
public accountability in the provision of strategic business
cases and project-gate evaluations, political responses to
project costs and public engagement risk disrupting
delivery against long-term policy objectives and manage-
ment of both anticipated and unanticipated impacts. In
broader societal terms, this risks undermining public
conﬁdence in political oversight of the planning system
and disruption of social relations that underpin economic
and employment outcomes.
So, is it possible, or even desirable, for IA prac-
titioner inﬂuence in government-led project decision-
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making to increase? Given the ﬁndings in this paper, it
is diﬃcult to conclude that IA practitioners alone
could, or should, change the course of political-
decision-making. While a project can be cancelled
with no reference to the impacts of cancellation or
major modiﬁcation, and there is little public transpar-
ency or accountability. A mandated opportunity to re-
evaluate or clear commitment from regulators to fol-
low-up on impact predictions and strategies at both
metropolitan and project scales, will assist practitioners
to inﬂuence the achievement of policy objectives (Arts
and Morrison-Saunders 2004).
IApractitioners,with the assistance of regulatory auth-
orities, have an important role to play in encouraging
accountability towards delivering policy objectives
through accountable and transparent impact manage-
ment strategies. Practitioners need to include manage-
ment commitments to be monitored (such as within a
SIMP) that relate back to the strategic policy objectives
and business case, which can be transferred in to approval
conditions. Research is also needed to support improved
social impact management and follow-up practices: to
plan, evaluate and adapt to the social changes generated
by transport-infrastructure inmetropolitancities. Further
research must acknowledge and consider the constraints
and inﬂuences placed on IA in the planning of transport-
infrastructure as highlighted by the PRL case, as part of
wider discussions in urban planning, governance and
project management. Meanwhile, the agendas of urban
metropolitan social and transport policies, and the stra-
tegic public need, should be considered by planners and
expert practitioners while a project is still ‘a line on a
map’, to achieve the greatest potential for delivering equi-
table social outcomes.
Notes
1. See Clause 228 of the Environmental, Planning and
Assessment Regulation 2000.
2. See Section 2.22 of the Act.
3. See Schedule 2, Clause 7(4) of the Regulation.
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